In common with other northern cities, Sheffield has experienced a dramatic reduction in funding from central government. Its response has been twofold. Firstly, to reduce the cost of service delivery, in part through augmenting or replacing public sector service provision through transfer to voluntary bodies and/or the private sector; the latter through private finance initiative (PFI) contracts. Secondly, the local authority has sought to promote economic regeneration through increased citizen involvement and participation. The problem for this combined strategy is that the two approaches have clashed over a previously underrated and overlooked area of public provision, namely the maintenance of street trees. Issues relating to the design of the contract, the economic imperative inherent within PFI contracts, initial reaction to popular protests, and reluctance to acknowledge the authority of alternative perspectives, have combined to undermine the salience of the participatory regeneration model for key sections of the local community.
Sheffield: innovation in response to austerity THIS ARTICLE addresses the attempt made by one northern local authority, Sheffield City Council (SCC), to develop an imaginative response to the consequences of the austerity policies introduced by the national government in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. The National Audit Office stated that local government was disproportionately affected by the austerity programme, with a 49.1 per cent reduction in central government funding in real terms between 2010-11 and 2017-18; municipalities and poorer areas experienced a disproportionately large funding reduction. At the same time, demand for services increased, caused by demographic change and rising homelessness, and increases in the national living wage raised the cost of service provision.
The scale and duration of the funding reductions for local authorities have meant that utilising reserves is, at best, only a temporary solution. Instead, local authorities have tended to respond by implementing service reductions, outsourcing public provision in search for efficiency gains, and experimenting to develop more innovative solutions to the challenges posed by the austerity environment. SCC utilised all these approaches. It adapted to the reduction in funding by reducing some service provision, and transferring others to be run by charitable bodies or outsourced to the private sector. Finally, it sought to challenge the basis of the austerity programme, aiming to mobilise the local community to create a more participatory form of economic development centred around the sense of place.
The outsourcing and transfer of public to private provision of services, through public private partnership (PPP) agreements, and facilitated via public finance initiative (PFI) funding, has a track record in Sheffield. During two periods of Liberal Democrat control, in 1999-2002 and 2008-2011, SCC contracted out services in urban property development, waste disposal and waste energy generation, school meals and backroom business services. A £2.2 billion PFI contract to renew Sheffield's highways, street lighting and the maintenance of street furniture, was finalised during this latter period, but following a change in the control of the council, was actually enacted by the incoming Labour cabinet. At the time, the contract was viewed as uncontroversial, being supported by the local MP and then Deputy Prime Minister in the coalition government, Nick Clegg, and facilitated by £1.2 billion of central government funding.
Simultaneously, however, SCC sought to challenge nationally-imposed austerity by developing a replacement narrative that aimed to utilise the engagement of citizens to pursue a form of progressive participatory regeneration. One aspect of this focussed upon evidence of rising inequality, through the establishment of a Fairness Commission and campaigning with the slogan 'Sheffield needs a pay rise', as a means of forging alliances across different sections of the population adversely impacted by austerity policies. This was supplemented by the regular 'state of Sheffield' reports, which were intended to utilise increased community participation as a means of constructing a more progressive sustainable growth and development strategy around a sense of place. If managed correctly, citizen engagement can encourage social inclusion and enhance the input legitimacy of the process and resultant strategy.
The combination of increasing reliance on the private sector to deliver an increasing proportion of public services, whilst simultaneously seeking to engage the local community to facilitate a progressive development strategy, is quite innovative. However, there was always a potential incompatibility between the two approaches. The contracting out of services sought to achieve efficiencies and cost reductions, but the subsequent trade-off was a rigid marketisation and the loss of control and transparency of those outsourced services by the local authority. By contrast, efforts to develop a narrative to motivate and mobilise local citizens and resources, and thereby create a more participatory model of growth, depends upon the maintenance of trust between stakeholders. This is difficult to sustain in the absence of transparency and accountability, should contentious issues arise.
These contradictions became evident in a dispute over a perhaps surprising element of local public service delivery, namely the maintenance of street trees. The decision to contract this work out to a private provider as part of a wider highway improvement project, together with the way in which the contract was drafted, and the subsequent response of invested parties to concerns raised by local citizen groups, resulted in this issue rising to international prominence. In the process, it damaged the trust required for the participative elements of the SCC regeneration strategy, and hence it contains pertinent lessons for policy makers and other interested stakeholder groups.
Sheffield street trees and PFI
Sheffield is home to around 4.5 million trees, with 35,100 of these being street trees (on the roadside or public highway). Reportedly, this represents the highest ratio of trees to people of any European city. In 2007, a SCC survey categorised 25,900 of these street trees-75 per cent of the total stock-as mature and over-mature. Despite intending to make engagement with the local community an integral part of the renewal project, a user satisfaction survey was not undertaken. Instead, the authority relied upon the number of requests to trim or remove trees that were causing a nuisance as a proxy for public concern. The solution advanced was to replace a number of the larger trees to rebalance the tree stock. 2 Given what subsequently transpired, this decision not to involve local residents in the planning of this area of the contract proved to be a critical error.
The choice of outsourcing street tree maintenance, as part of the larger 'Streets Ahead' highways renewal contract, took the form of a £2.2 billion PPP/PFI contract, where a public sector agency contracts the private sector to build, maintain and potentially deliver public services, paid for through general or local taxation. The use of PPP/PFI contracts has been widely utilised in the UK and adopted internationally, with the global value of projects estimated to have exceeded US$394 billion between 2005 and 2011. The rationale for using a PPP/PFI form of outsourcing is that private sector providers can draw upon greater expertise and superior management, together with increased motivation resulting from a combination of competitive pressures and greater incentives available in the private sector to deliver a project or public service delivery at lower cost. Private sector firms were intended to take on part of the risk inherent in the project and this justified them making a profit from what was formally a non-profit public service. These profits were often enlarged by the private contractor using debt financing (gearing) to raise rates of return.
The 'Streets Ahead' PFI contract was awarded to Amey, a subsidiary of Spanish transnational corporation Ferrovial. The rationale for the renewal of Sheffield's highways was not controversial since there had been underinvestment over a number of decades. However, the actions of the contractor in felling large numbers of trees elicited significant criticism. Between 2012 and 2018, 5,474 street trees were cut down in Sheffield. The scale of this felling programme prompted the formation of the Sheffield Tree Action Group (STAG) to coordinate protests against what many residents perceived as the unnecessary destruction of a valuable natural asset. The lack of transparency inherent in the PFI contract, supposedly to protect sensitive commercial information, would appear to have undermined trust in those associated with the street tree maintenance programme amongst sections of the civic community.
SCC was initially unwilling to recognise the points raised by its critics and acted defensively to justify the tree felling as an act of last resort. Civic tensions were worsened through poorly considered actions, such as the felling of memorial trees planted to commemorate the war dead in one particular area of the city. They were further heightened by the use of injunctions against opposition councillors, the use of security guards to prevent protesters from disrupting the tree felling programme, the actions of the police-including arresting protesters standing in their own front gardens-and the incident in which residents of Rustlings Road were woken at 5am to demand they move their cars to facilitate a pre-dawn tree felling operation. Not surprisingly, these actions were heavily criticised. Clegg described the situation as resembling 'Putin's Russia', whilst the then Secretary of State for the Environment, Michael Gove, expressed his 'grave concern' over the 'environmental vandalism'. The Woodland Trust described it as a 'tree massacre', whilst the Yorkshire Post claimed that police actions raised uncomfortable 'echoes of Orgreave'. 3 Even taking into account the political loyalties of some of these commentators, the degree of critical commentary was substantial.
By this point, it was becoming increasingly clear that the strategy of forcing through a policy against the wishes of a significant group within the local community was becoming increasingly problematic and threatened long-term damage to the reputation of the city and its elected officials. The crisis situation also overshadowed some of the good work that SCC and the contractor were doing in partnership with the University of Sheffield and the Rotherham Wildlife Trust to create 'living highways' by making roadside verges more pleasant and attractive to wildlife.
A clash of two incompatible perspectives?
The nature of PFI contracts is such that when the private delivery of a service becomes controversial, its rigidities and lack of transparency inhibit possible solutions. Moreover, whilst the economic theory is that they can be used to drive efficiency and cost savings for public agencies, there is often a secondary reason why PFI is used to fund public investments and service delivery, namely that effectively, it occurs off the public sector balance sheet. This has proved popular for successive national UK governments seeking to maintain their reputation for the probity of public finances. Yet it is a clear case of fiscal illusion, since an accounting sleight of hand does nothing to improve public finances in the long term. Indeed, the Office for Budgetary Responsibility
estimated that, had PFI projects been re-designated as public expenditure, official government borrowing levels would have been around 2 per cent of GDP higher. However, this enthusiasm for the approach often meant that, for public services in desperate need for renewal investment, there was a temptation to engage in creative accounting with the cost-benefit analysis that was intended to safeguard public investments, whilst PPP/PFI projects came to be viewed as the 'only game in town'. The evidence for PFI contracts to realise significant savings for the public sector is 'strongly contested', whilst the failure of HM Treasury to collect relevant data has frustrated unequivocal quantification of any such benefits. As a result, the Public Accounts Committee stated that it could discover 'no clear and explicit justification and evaluation for the use of PFI in terms of its value for money'. 4 The literature contains a substantial critique of the PFI model, typically focussing on service quality. Indeed, by 2017, one third of PPP contracts (when measured by capital value) had suffered major problems and were subject to buyout or terminated; of these, 42 per cent returned to direct public provision. 5 The degree of competition was often quite limited for PFI contracts, and the economic theory of oligopolistic markets contradicts optimistic predictions of efficiency gains. Splitting purchaser from provider can fragment services and create dynamic inefficiencies. The long-term nature of contracts reduces the flexibility of action for public agencies to respond to changing conditions. Patterns of demand for the public service are likely to change over time, whilst advances in technique and/or technology may signify that service delivery, deemed appropriate two decades previously, may no longer apply. The National Audit Office found that renegotiation of contracts mid-term has tended to increase costs. Moreover, the collapse of large PFI contracts, such as those operated by Carillion, are the most visible sign that the public sector ultimately has to accept the risk inherent in the contracting out of service provision. Finally, PFI contracts tend to exhibit inadequate transparency and accountability, weakening citizen trust and impairing the ability for public sector bodies adequately to monitor contactor activities.
Many of these overall flaws of PFI contracts were also characteristic of the Sheffield tree maintenance programme. The SCC and contractor were reluctant to publish details of key aspects the PFI contract until ordered to do so by the Information Commissioner in 2018. This revealed that the performance conditions included a requirement for the service provider to replace mature or overmature highway trees 'at a rate of not less than 200 per year, in order that 17,500 highway trees are replaced by the end of the term' of the PFI contract. 6 This would appear to represent prima facie evidence that a minimum level of tree removal and replacement was introduced as a contractual requirement -a target to be met. However, SCC remains adamant that this is not the case and that the inclusion of tree numbers provided an upper costing envelope within which actual operations could occur as required. Interestingly, a report prepared for the South Yorkshire Police and Crime Commissioner indicated that they had been informed that SCC anticipated approximately 10,000 trees to be removed. This would suggest, at the very least, that the PFI contract had been inadequately specified on this key point. Irrespective of whether the contract included a rigid or indicative target for tree removal, the intention would appear to be to remove and replace considerably more mature trees than would be required if the full range of maintenance and engineering solutions were considered. Moreover, there is additional evidence to suggest that the contractor had bid for the work on the basis of the road maintenance programme and had given relatively little consideration to the aspect of the contract relating to street trees. 7 The lack of transparency surrounding the terms of the PFI contract caused wider problems. For example, the Local Government and Social Care Ombudsman was forced to make a finding of fault against Amey and the SCC, stating that they 'deliberately' misled two local residents over whether an independent expert tree review had recommended the retention or removal of a specific tree. Furthermore, a Forestry Commission investigation into the legality of the tree felling activities expressed concern that the inclusion of a specific annual target of 'not less than 200 trees' in the PFI contract might appear to be 'arbitrary' and the result of a policy decision rather than in conjunction with pursuing statutory duties. Whilst finding insufficient evidence to determine whether a breach of the 1967 Forestry Act had occurred, the Forestry Commission did conclude that the Streets Ahead programme had 'fallen far short of good practice' in the areas of inadequate record keeping, engagement with the local community and tree management practices which appeared to demonstrate a clear and consistent preference for choosing felling as a first solution over other engineering and maintenance solutions. 8 The lack of flexibility inherent in PFI contracts was demonstrated in SCC's reluctance to consider cancelling or renegotiating the PFI contract once the problem with street trees had become apparent. Even the attempt by SCC to find a compromise solution, by establishing an independent panel of experts to advise on whether felling was warranted in the case of specific trees, proved to be problematic, since recommendations were overruled in three-quarters of the cases examined by the panel-and yet SCC still had to pay Amey £700,000 in compensation for delays caused by this new process.
Broader than just the flawed PFI model, concerns about transparency also related to the basis of the cost-benefit calculation at the heart of the treatment of public goods. In this case, the suspicion remained that the apparent exclusion of external bodies from the decision making process about whether to retain and maintain or replace mature street trees, may have resulted in both the local authority and contractor concluding that it was more cost-effective to select the second of these options.
It is well known that market prices struggle to price accurately common property resources and public goods. Therefore, economic methods including production function, stated and revealed preference (such as house prices proxying feelings of well-being), are used in an attempt to identify those externalities which would otherwise be excluded from calculations (made by public as well as private organisations) of the true value of the natural environment. 9 Hence, the true value of street trees is not contained solely in their timber value, or the cost of replacement, but rather in the degree to which air quality is improved, pollution is mitigated (with resultant health benefits), carbon capture occurs, temperature extremes are reduced through shading and evaporative cooling, noise is abated, wildlife habitat is maintained and wellbeing is derived from living in a green and more restful setting. These benefits are set against costs related to damage to structures from tree roots and falling branches together with excessive shading. Since mature trees have greater net positive impact upon the environment, it would seem to follow, ceteris paribus, that unnecessary felling of trees would be likely to reduce natural capital by a greater amount than the associated cost of maintaining these same trees.
Various attempts have been made to estimate the net social benefit of street trees. One approach, using CAVAT (cost of replacement) methodology, estimated the immediate loss to the Sheffield community from the tree felling programme to be in the region of £65.5 million, falling to £59.6 million after two decades if replacement trees experience healthy growth. 10 Irrespective of whether this is an over-or under-estimate of the net loss of natural capital for the Sheffield community, the lack of transparency associated with the PFI contract meant that it was not clear whether these considerations were taken into account in the planning phase of the street tree maintenance programme. The fact that the local authority, concerned with the consequences of funding reductions and the effects of austerity for the region, had failed to establish adequately and transparently a detailed strategy for street tree maintenance, might be understandable if unfortunate. However, the apparent disinterest shown by both contractual parties on this issue when the PFI contract was signed, and the performance requirements established, probably explains many of the weaknesses in the approach that were exposed as the programme of work was rolled out.
The path to resolution
Following an initial failure to recognise properly and respond to the problems arising from the street tree maintenance programme, SCC began openly to consider alternative options in late 2017. The leader of the council was quoted as stating that the authority was considering bringing the highways PFI contract back in-house should this prove financially viable. Moreover, the controlling Labour group within the council stated that the authority had never supported the PFI model, but reluctantly used this approach as the only available means of securing the funding to complete long overdue repairs and improvements to the city's road infrastructure. This followed Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell's speech at the Labour Party Conference, where he announced that a future Labour government would respond to the perceived wastefulness of PFI contracts by returning all existing PFI contracts back within the public sector and refusing to ratify any new agreements.
The viability of the PFI model was further called into question by the collapse of Carillion in January 2018. The failure of one of the leading sub-contractors involved in the PFI programme raised questions over the practical viability of the PFI approach. Associated losses to central government of an estimated £148 million, in addition to further costs to those public sector bodies which had to replace PFI and other public sector contracts at very short notice, have further undermined the willingness of public authorities to utilise this form of funding. Not surprisingly, given these events, the Office for Budgetary Responsibility concluded that PFI was the source of significant fiscal risk to the government and, as a result, the 2018 Budget announced that PFI would no longer be used for new projects. 11 It has been reported that around one third of Conservative, and 42 per cent of Labour councils returned some services in-house in 2017. Moreover, private contractors, including Amey, have been divesting some of their outsourcing work, at least partially because of concerns over the quality and inflexibility of the form of PFI contracts.
The acknowledgement of the flaws within the PFI model did not, however, immediately resolve the Sheffield street trees issue, as concerns over the financial implications of terminating the contract appear to have deterred SCC from bringing highways and street tree maintenance back in-house. One suggestion, made by protesters, related to the possibility that the local authority could terminate the contract early owing to a claimed failure of the contractor to notify the council of a previous health and safety offence committed prior to the signing of the contract. A freedom of information request appeared to confirm that no notification was given, but this was subsequently contradicted by the local authority, which claimed to have been notified of the incident. Once again, the apparent defensiveness and imprecise communication on behalf of both the local authority and contractor reinforced the impression of official obstruction rather than open engagement.
Simultaneously, however, a pause in tree felling occurred pending the agreement of a joint position, brokered by the Bishop of Sheffield, between the local authority, the contractor and the protest groups. This was eventually forthcoming in December 2018 and, whilst it did not resolve all of the differences between the different stakeholders, it did point to a way forward. The agreement, for example, reflected a significant shift in the attitude towards the mature nature of the Sheffield street tree stock, moving away from the presumption to replace it with younger trees towards recognition of the value of the asset and its environmental, ecological and mental health benefits. As a consequence, the joint agreement suggested that the presumption was now that mature trees should be retained where this was technically feasible. The contested issue surrounding targets for tree removal was superseded by the suggestion that Amey and STAG undertake joint assessments of those individual trees outstanding from the core investment period of the PFI contract.
One factor seemingly significant in the shift towards a more accommodating approach on behalf of the local authority and contractor would appear to have been the damage that the dispute was having upon the reputation of the city. Local election results may have also been a contributory factor, as the Labour majority on the council was reduced in both the 2018 and 2019 elections. Whilst it is difficult to isolate other potential causes of shifts in electoral opinion (and hence seek to prove causality) in such a relatively small sample, it is worth noting that the two wards where the majority of disputed trees are located-Nether Edge and Gleadless Valley-both elected Green councillors rather than their previous Labour incumbents. In addition, in the aftermath of the May 2018 local elections, the appointment of a new Cabinet member for the Environment, Streetscene and Climate Change, following the resignation of the previous incumbent, further facilitated the shift in the approach of the SCC towards greater conciliation.
The private contractor, Amey, may also have been more amenable to renegotiation of its role in street tree maintenance following difficulties experienced in other PFI contracts in the UK, resulting in divestments out of PPPs in Birmingham and Liverpool. Following these events, the 2018 annual report of Amey's parent company, Ferrovial, indicated a write-down of the market value investment in Amey's operations amidst an indication of the uncertainty over the future prospects of Amey's activities in the UK. It is not inconceivable, therefore, that continued criticism of their activities in Sheffield, and an increasing openness amongst councillors to consider alternatives to the current PFI contract arrangements, may have encouraged Amey to be more willing to consider technical solutions which they had previously resisted as impractical for cost or other reasons. It would appear that the greater willingness on behalf of the contractor to countenance a wider use of technical solutions, and for themselves to cover any increased costs inherent in such actions, was critical in securing this agreement.
This new approach culminated, in July 2019, in the creation of a steering group to oversee the street tree maintenance programme, with the Chief Executive of the Sheffield and Rotherham Wildlife Trust appointed as independent chair. The SCC report additionally noted that, of the remaining 309 street trees initially identified for removal as part of the Streets Ahead programme, 191 had been accepted as capable of being retained on a long-term basis, twenty-six trees required bespoke technical solutions and, with a further ninety-one trees still pending investigation, only one tree out of this list was confirmed as requiring removal and replacement. 12 It would appear, therefore, that the critics of the original tree felling programme were largely vindicated in that alternative technical solutions could indeed be found to resolve all but a small minority of problems.
Implications for policy formation
There are a number of implications that arise for policy makers from the Sheffield tree dispute. For SCC, there were two main consequences. Firstly, the local authority has had to invest time and resources into developing a new and improved street tree strategy which better reflects the impact upon the local community and internalises the value of the natural capital involved. Though a painful process for the council leadership at times, the resultant compromise solution would appear to be a considerable improvement. In addition, the controversy would appear to have been at least partly responsible for SCC's announcement of a fifteen-year strategy to manage woodlands and street trees sustainably, seeking to increase numbers by around 100,000 over the following decade. This seems to suggest the acceptance by all actors that street trees and woodlands are, in the future, to be viewed as an asset to be nurtured rather than as a burden to be removed and replaced.
The second consequence for SCC concerns the legacy that the street tree controversy may have upon the degree of trust placed in the local authority by significant sections of the local community. One commentator has argued that the 'out-sourcing of publiclyfunded services has resulted in a dramatic deterioration in public-relations and local community engagement [which is] a longterm debt to be re-paid'. 13 If this effect is restricted to the already accounted shift in electoral support in those wards most closely associated with street tree protests, then the consequences for the current controlling group on the council may not be too severe. However, a fracturing of trust in the local authority amongst certain parts of the local community weakens the attempt that SCC was making to harness citizen engagement in challenging nationally imposed austerity and developing a replacement narrative around a more progressive form of participatory regeneration. To the extent that engagement with this alternative regeneration initiative is weakened by the legacy of the street tree controversy, this will have a longer lasting deleterious effect upon the local community.
For policy makers more widely, the difficulties caused by the Sheffield street tree controversy are likely to have three main effects. Firstly, difficulties caused by the Streets Ahead programme will be added to the growing critical literature highlighting inherent weaknesses in the PFI model. Issues relating to contract inflexibility, the lack of transparency, and accountability for services transferred from public to private provision need to be reflected upon before any future PPP initiatives are considered. Secondly, the issues arising from the Sheffield case study have raised the profile of street trees for policy makers and other stakeholders. Whilst Sheffield has suffered intense scrutiny and criticism following the tree felling programme, the Sunday Times reported that the number of trees felled by Newcastle and Edinburgh local authorities was more substantial. Thus, the under-valuation of street trees and other forms of natural capital would appear to be more widespread than the focus upon a single sub-region might suggest. Nevertheless, the enhanced visibility of issues pertaining to natural capital has resulted in more detailed policy formation at national level, including initiatives such as the Urban Tree Challenge Fund intended to facilitate the planting of 130,000 urban trees over a three-year period. Finally, Sheffield's experience indicates the importance of perceptions of legitimacy for local authorities seeking to utilise community participation and an agreed sense of place to enhance and embed a sustainable and alternative form of development.
